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COMPARISON OF THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
I.

Some of the most memorable events of the twentieth century took
place as a result of conflict.

Out of the numerous conflict·s staged

during this period, only one was resolved not on a common everyday piece
of writing paper.

The proponents of the conflict--E. V. Huntington,

Oswald Veblen, Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and David Hilbert--did
not use weapons, but they used basic mathematical structure to wage the
most extensive and critical investigation into the foundations of
mathematics.

As a result three schools of thought which are of special

prominence and interest were brought to light.

These are the postulational

school, the logical school, and the formalist school.
The postulational school is led by Professors E. V. Huntington and
Oswald Veblen.

The specific aim of the school is to establish satis-

factory set s of postulates for various branches of mathematics.
The logical school centers around Bertrand Russell and Professor
A. N. Whitehead, and their three-volume treatise, Principia Mathematica .
The members of this school are interest ed in the explicit formulation of
symbolic logic as a foundation for mathematics.
The formalist school i s led by David Hilbert of the University of
Gottingen, an eminent mathematician who near the beginning of the century
would have been classed as a postulationist.

The formalist are attempting

2

to make mathematical proofs rigorous by formalizing the structure of
mathematics. 1

II.
The reasoning underlying the program of the postulational school
is simple and amounts to this.
starting point somewhere.

Any branch of mathematics must have a

The postulates as employed, appear in there

in perfect light as systems of principles underlying and supporting
definite bodies of thought, and so they serve as a model, as an ideal
prototype, for the inspiration, the guidance and the criticism of every
rational enterprise. 2 Not all of the propositions can be proved and
neither can all of its technical terms be defined.

In order to com-

pletely prove all the propositions, the mathematician must have assumed
certain propositions unconsciously and used certain terms glibly without
realizing that they were undefined, or else he has been guilty of a
"vicious circle" error.
To proceed rationally in the

deve~opment

of a mathematical

discipline, it is desirable to make the unproved properties (postulates
and theorems ) and undefined terms as explicit as possible.
logical reasoning, it is possible to

defin~

Then by

the concepts of the subject

in terms of the undefined concepts and deduce further propositions from
the unproved propositions.

To avoid contradictions it is necessary to

adopt a definite restricted set of postulates and a definite restricted
lE. Russell Stabler, "An Interpretation and Comparison of Three
Schools of Thought in the Foundations of Mathematics, 11 Mathematics Teacher,
28 (1962) .
2cassius J. Keyser, Mathematical Philosophy (New York:
and Company, 1922 ) .

E. P. Dutton
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number of undefined terms.3
The methodology is that of generalization ·by suppression of certain
postulates defining a given system.

The system defined by the curtailed

set of postulates is then developed.

At this stage, the undefined terms

and the postulates have some concrete or psychological significance to
the mind.

For example, the postulates may make concrete statements about

such undefined terms as points, lines, or numbers.4 However, if the
undefined terms are as they are called, undefined, it must be possible
to abstract all previous connotations from them, and to treat them as
mere symbols, devoid of any special significance other than what may be
implied about them in the statement of postulates,

It must also be

possible to reinterpret these symbols in new ways.

If some new concret e

interpretation can be found--which itself appeals to the judgement as
being self-consistent--then it is claimed that the postulates are logically consistent.
As an illustration consider the undefined class of elements called
"points"; an undefined sub-class of points called "lines''; and an undefined number associated with two points of a line, called ulengths."
Assume a knowledge of certain ideas of arit hmetic and general language.
A point, P, is said to be on a line, 1.

Two lines are said to intersect

if there is a point which belongs to both of them.

With these preliminary

assumptions, the following postulates are proposed in geometry.
1.

Two distinct "lines" intersect in two and only two distinct
"points."

3stabler, op. cit.
4E. T. Bell, The Development of Mathematics (New York:
Hill Book Company, 1945).

McGraw-
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2.

Through the two intersection 11 points 11 of two 11 lines 11 pass an
infinite number of 11 lines.''
The 11 distance 11 between two intersecting 11 points 11 of two
11
lines 11 is the same along all of the 11 lines 11 which pass
through the two 11 points. 11
Every 11 line' 1 has a finite 11 length 11 which is equal to the
11
length 11 of every other 11 line. 11
Through two 11 points 11 which are not intersection 11 points 11 of
two 11 lines 11 there passes one and only one 11 line. 11

3.

4.

5.

These postulates are not altogether easy to comprehend, and a
person thoroughly imbued with the traditional view of mathematics would
not hesitate to deny their validity, even if reminded that
11

line, 11 and

11

length 11 are undefined terms.

11

point, 11

However, it will be simpler

to remember the abstractness of the original terms used in the postulates, and to reinterpret these words directly.

The object is to find

some concrete interpretation which will satisfy all five postulates,
and it is easy to do this.
class of

11

points 11 as the class of

sphere of three dimemsion 11 ;
11

All that is necessary is to interpret the

11

11

points on the surface of a fixed

length 11 as the concept of

11

arc length 11 or

distance 11 as measured along a great circle of the sphere.

The postu-

lates now read as follows:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

Two distinct spheres intersect in two and only two distinct
points of the sphere.
Through the two intersection points of two spheres there pass
an infinite number of circles.
The distance between the two intersection points of two
spheres is the same along all of the circles which pass
through the two points.
Every circle has a finite length which is equal to the length
of every other great circle.
Through two points o.f the sphere which are not intersection
points of two great circles there passes one and only one
circle.

These statements are all quickly judged to be true because of proven
theories of Euclidean geometry of the sphere.

Furthermore, since

Euclidean geometry is self-consistent, it is possible to state that the
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original five postulates are consistent.
When a tentative list of postulates has been shown to be a consistent set, it is perfectly conceivable that certain postulates of the
set are logically deducible from others of the set.
are superfluous, or redundant.

Such postulates

There is no inherent logical fallacy in

using a redundant consistent set of postulates, but for at least two
reasons it is often desirable that the postulates be free of redundance
or independent.

First, an independent set of postulates renders the

structure of the subject more aesthetically pleasing since no statement
is included as a postulate which might be deduced as a theorem.

Second,

if the redundant postulates are removed, it is possible to go back to
any concrete interpretation used in establishing consistency and have
fewer postulates to judge true or false than previously.

Thus the

soundness of the structure of the subject is made to depend more on
abstract logical relations, and less on concrete interpretation judgements.
Another characteristic which a consistent set of postulates may
or may not possess is that of categoricalness.

A set is categorical if

it forms the foundation for essentially only one branch of mathematics,
while a set is non-categorical if it can serve as a foundation for two
or more essentially different branches of mathematics.

It would hardly

be possible here to give a satisfactory illustration of a categorical
set of postulates, but it is not as difficult to cite an example of a
non-categorical set. 6
Start with an undefined class, K, or elements which may be

6
designated as A, B, C•••

Suppose that an undefined operation or relation-

ship between any two elements of the class defines a third element which
may or may not belong to the class.
on A and B is designated as A # B.

The element obtained by operating
Now the following postulates are

agreed upon:
1.
2.

3.
4.

If A and B are elements of the class K, A # B belongs to K.
If A, B, C belong to K, then (A# B) # C =A# (B #C ) .
There exists a unique element X of K such that X# X= X.
For any element A of K there exists a unique element A1 of
K such that A# AI =X.

Since there are many concrete systems having only a finite number of
elements, which satisfy the postulates it is possible to make the
following replacements.

One permutation, A, replaces x by y and y by x;

the other permutation, B, replaces x by itself andy by itself.

A# B

will be interpretated as the result of performing permutation A and
following it by permutation B.
When interpreting the postulates in accordance with these agreements, the first postulate requires that the result of performing

any

two permutations · of the class successively is a permutation belonging to
the class.

By trying all the possibilities it is easy to see that this

postulate is satisfied.

Thus, since A replaces x by y and B replaces y

by itself, A# B replaces x by y and in the same way it replaces y by x;
in other words, A # B is the element A which is known to belong to the
class.

Similarly, A # A= B, B #A= A, and B # B =B.

By the same

kind of observations the second postulate is satisfied.
The third postulate requires that a unique "identical" element,
X, exists such that X # X = X.

The element B meets this requirement

inasmuch as B # B = B; furthermore, it is the only element of K which
meets the requirement, as A does not.

7
The fourth postulate requires the existence of unique "inverse''
elements, A1 and B 1 , for both A and B.
and is called A # A = B, B # B

Now B is the identical element

= B; furthermore, if operations are made

on A by B, or on B by A, the identical element is not obtained.

Thus,

there is a unique inverse for each element of the class--namely, the
element itself--and the postulate is satisfied.
This is not judged as a concrete class of two elements, with the
accompanying interpretation of the undefined operation, that satisfies
all four of our postulates.

Since some systems which satisfy the postu-

lates may contain an infinite number of elements, and this system has
only two elements, a one-to-one correspondence cannot be set up.

Hence

the four postulates are non-categorical; they are not sufficient to
determine a distinctive mathematical science.
It is not inferred that a set of postulates is not useful if noncategorical.

On the contrary there are often advantages in having a

non-categorical set.

For in this way it is possible to develop parts

of a number of separate branches of mathematics at the same time.

Thus,

in any system which satisfies the postulates for a group, the theorem
which can be deduced from these postulates will be true, regardless of
whether or not the systems can be put one-to-one correspondence with
each other.
The first concern of the school is to establish consistent sets
of postulates for various mathematical sciences.

It is usually desirable

that a set of postulates be independent, and sometimes a set is desired
to be categorical, sometimes non-categorical.

It is notable that in

establishing consistency, independence, and categoricalness, the proofs
depend first, on the abstract nature of the postulates when the undefined
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terms are treated as abstract symbols; second, on the possibility of
interpreting the undefined terms, and hence the postulates, in ·many
concrete ways having psychological or intuitive significance; third,
on a process of judging that these postulates are satisfied or not
satisfied for a given concrete interpretation or system; and fourth,
on an assuption that each of the concrete systems used is selfconsistent.
To summarize the characteristic features of mathematics from the
postulational view point, mathematics is a collection of mathematical
sciences whose subject matter may be considered either as abstract, or
concrete in innumerable directions.

Any mathematical science in com-

pleted form is a deductive structure of thought exhibiting a logical
chain of reasoning from postulates to theorems, and a corresponding
building up process from undefined terms to defined terms.

The postu-

lates are not to be considered as self-evident truths, but rather as
assumptions concerning fundamental properties which are made in the
beginning for the purpose of getting started in the particular branch
of mathematics under consideration.

It is essential that the postulates

be consistent, but absolute proofs of consistency do not seem to be
possible.

The theorems are not absolutely true, but rather are true at

most in relation to the postulates and methods of deductive reasoning
used in deriving them.?
III.

According to logicalism, mathematics is a branch of logic.

Math-

ematical logic is deductive reasoning as it occurs in mathematics. 8 The
7Ibid.
8Bell, op. cit.
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starting point is a set of undefined or "primitive ideas," and a group
of unproved propositions of logic, whose choice is held to be more or less
an arbitrary matter.

A preliminary symbolism is adopted for most of the

primitive ideas, and most of the primitive propositions are stated in
complete symbolic form.
The symbols are at first repellant; they tend to frighten but are
not in fact difficult to master.

Theoretically, the symbols are not

essential but practically they are indispensible as instruments for
economizing our intellectual energy.9

The reduction to symbols is

supposed to show the point of application of mathematics, as it were the
attachment by means of which it is plugged into its application. 10

It

is significant that the primitive ideas and corresponding symbols are
not abstract in the sense that the undefined terms or symbols of a branch
of mathematics can be considered to be abstract in the postulational
school; on the contrary, symbols are used from the beginning to represent concrete logical ideas in concise and convenient form.
Important among the primitive ideas are the following:

elementary

propositions, elementary propositional functions, assertion, negation,
and disjunction.

An elementary propostition (designated by p, q, r, etc.)

is a statement of the form "this book is green"; an elementary propositional function is a statement with a variable or undetermined element
such that when a definite meaning, or value, is assigned to the variable
the resulting statement is an elementary proposition.

For example,

9cassius J. Keyser, Mathematical Philosophy (New York:
and Company, 1922).

11

x

E. P. Dutton

lOLudwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics
(Oxford: Alden and Mowbrary Ltd., 1967).

10

is a man" is a propositional function, because if we substitute
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this

Mr. Brown" or "this dog" the result is an elementary proposition. A
property, p, may be asserted to be true (written "!- p'') or it may be
merely considered.

The negative of a certain proposition, p, is the

proposition "not p 11 or 11-'\J p."
q if the property "p or
written

11

11

The distinction of two properties p and

that is "either p is true or q is true,"

p\lq."

The ideas of elementary proposition, negation, and disjunction
make the all important definition, the definition implication.

The

statement "p implies <:a." written by 11 p.>q 11 is defined to 1nean the same
thing as 11 ...-v pyq" that is "either p is false or q is true, " or "if p
is true, then q is true."
The notion of implication is prominent in the statement of the
primitive propositions.

A few of the more significant of these may

follow:
l.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Anything implied by a true elementary property is true.
If, f 1 , can be asserted to be true and we can assert that
f}!fz, then we can assert f 2 is true .
( pvp J>P
(p or p implies p)
q _:, (pvq)
(q implies p or q )
(pl/q )_::, (qyp )

The primitive properties should be referred to as assertions of primitive
propositional functions, for the letters p, q stand for variable or
undetermined elementary propostions, and it is asserted that the statements hold for every specific property which may be substituted for p, q.
Some of the significent theorems in the theory of d·e duction which
are deduced from the primitive propositions are the following:
l.
2.

3.

(p .:::>'"'-' p )..)'""'-" P "if p ~~lies not p, then p if false "
[p:> r )J>[(p .: > q )> (p ..:;, r )j "if q implies r, then ifl p implies
q, p implies r.
pVrvp
"p is true or p is false"

ll

4.
5.

P~ ·-v ( '""" p )

"p implies that not p is false ''
(p .::> q ) ,:) (,..; q.:>.-vp )
"if p implies q,. then not q implies
not p"

All of these theorems are seen to correspond to methods of
deductive reasoning which are usually taken for granted.

There is not

quarrel with the postulational view that the method and structure of
mathematics are deductive, but in the postulational school the nature
of deductive reasoning remains largely unanalyzed, while in the logical
school the deductive methods and concepts are themselves developed in
great detail from a foundation of undefined terms and unproved properties
of logic.

Furthermore, instead of viewing the subject matter of mathe-

matics as wholly abstract, the logical school looks upon mathematical
subject matter as consisting of any concepts which may be ultimately
traced back and defined in terms of the undefined concepts of logic.
Mathematics is not now a collection of deductive sciences, each with its
own foundation, but a single unified deductive science with a single
foundation in logic.
Symbolic logic has established the thesis that all existing mathematics (and presumable all potential mathematics ) is literally a logical
outgrowth of a few primitive ideas, and a few primitive propositions of
logic. 11 Unrestricted in subject matter, logic analyzes its propositions
12
as referring to classes and attributes.
No relationship can be defined
without a logical frame and any apparent disharmony in the description
of experiences can be eliminated only by an appropriate widening of the
11Keyser, op. cit.
12Arthur Pap, "Mathematics, Abstract Entities, and Modern Semantics, "
Scientific Monthly, 85 (1957 ) , 32.

12
conceptual framework. 1 3

IV.
Finally, the formalist school, like the logical school, is
attempting to carry the ultimate foundation of mathematical knowledge
further back than the postulational school.

At the same time, they are

trying to establish the consistency of all mathematics, and thus are
attacking a problem which is not explicitly investigated by the logical
school.

Hilbert contends that the ultimate foundation for mathematics

lies not in logic, but in certain pre-logical objects which are preliminary conditions for logical thinking, and about which seem to be
viewed with a definite intuitive knowledge.
Certain mathematical statements, made by the use of symbols, are
immediately capable of verification by the intuitive method, because of
the inherent nature of the concepts represented by the symbols 3 + 1
1 + 3.

This statement is an example of a real proposition.
On the other hand, certain other mathematical statements, like

a + 1

=1 +

a where a represents any integer, are not verified in this

way, because it is impossible to test all possible integers in the
equation.

To avoid the difficulty this equation must be thought of as

a purely formal statement, and if it is to be verified at all it must
be verified by formal argument without regard to the meaning of the
statement.

Statements of this second type are examples of ideal propo-

sitions, and the formal agruments necessary to establish them are to be
made, according to definite rules, from previously listed axioms, with
I

1 3Niels Bohr, "Mathematics and Natural Philosophy,'' Scientific
Monthly, 82 (1956 ) , 86.

reliance now merely on our intuitive knowledge of the characteristics
of marks as marks.

Examples of axioms are:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

A-+-

(B~

A)

B ~ AVB
A ~

A

A= a
a= b ~
a = o

A ( a ) ~ A (b )

As the specific foundation for this formalized structure the
formalist propose axioms which are the images of fundamental logical
and mathematical ideas, concerned with implication and ordinary integers.
By following formal rules which are so chosen as to coFrespond with
accepted processes of deductive thinking theorems are deduced from the
axioms.

These again are images of corresponding theorems having thought

content.

New axioms are introduced as a basis for continuing the pro-

cess, provided at each state the consistency of the axioms is established.
The method of proving consistency is also a special formula procedure
baeed pn two of the original axioms.

In other words, every proof should

be so reconstructed as to make apparent a particular kind of formal
structure which can be discovered by appropriate restatement of it. 1 4
The purpose of the formalized procedure is not to make mathematics
an arbitrary game with meaningless marks, but to render the logical
structure of existing mathematics more secure by making it more definitely objective.

This theory makes explicit the rules according to

which thinking proceeds, and thereby provides a basis for objective
thinking in all fields, as opposed to subjective opinion and emotion.

1 4constantine Plitis, "Limitations of Formalization," Philosophy
Science, 32 (1965 ) .
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v.
First, a general survey from the postulational standpoint, mathematics is a collection of deductive sciences each having its own set of
postulates and undefined terms, each making free use of logic in
developing its own set of theorems; from the logical standpoint,. mathematics is a unified science which can be developed out of logical concepts from logical principles, and by use of logical principles; from
the formalist standpoint, the formal structure o.f mathematics is to be
developed from certain logical and mathematical axioms, considered as
images of thought, by means of formal application of the rules of
deduction.
From all three standpoints, the method and structure of mathematics may be called deductive, for, in each case, the program calls
for assumptions and undefinej terms as a starting point for the use of
deductive reasoning to arrive at new conclusions.

In the postulational

school there are different starting points for the various mathematical
sciences, most of which assume deductive logic without analyzing it; in
the logical school the starting point is carried down into the primitive
ideas and propositions of logic, and logic is then developed in great
detail, finally merging with mathematics; in the formalist school, the
most fundamental level of the foundations goes still deeper, and consists in our intuitive knowledge of pre-logical and pre-math symbols,
while the next higher level consists of axioms both of mathematics and
logic.
It seems fair to say that any. judgement concerning the truth or
consistency of the assumptions used in any of the three schools, depends
in the last analysis, on intuitive, unproved notions.

Any absolute

15
basis for claiming truth or consistency thus seems to be lacking.
Therefore, certain general conclusions concerning the nature of
mathematics, when viewed in the light of modern investigations, can be
drawn.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

The subject matter of mathematics is not restricted to ideas
of "number and space." From the modern point of veiw the
subject matter may include logic, abstract sciences, and a
wide range of concr·e te interpretations. The ultimate origin
of the subject matter seems to be in intuitive ideas.
A starting point consisting of assumptions and undefined
terms is necessary for the development of any mathematical
structure. No matter whether this starting ·point is
explicitely formulated in logic, beyond logic, or prior to
logic, any judgement concerning the truth of the assumptions
seems to depend on intuitive considerations.
The method by which a mathematical structure is developed is
the method of deductive reasoning used in obtaining theorems
from the fundamental assumptions, and the corresponding process of defining new concepts with ultimate dependence on the
original undefined concepts.
The soundness of a mathematical structure of thought depends
on the soundness of the deductive reasoning used in developing it, and on the consistency of the original assumptions.
So far no absolute basis has been established for judging
whether these requirements are met.
The theorems of mathematics are not absolute truths. They
are true at most in relation to the postulates from which
they were deduced, and the methods of reasoning by which they
were deduced.

VI.
The contrast of these conclusions with the traditional view of
mathematics is striking but it is not safe to claim that a presentation
of any final picture of the nature of mathematics has been made; for
the fundamental concepts and methods of mathematics are perpetually in
a state of evolution and conflict. 1 5
1 5stabler, op. cit.
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